E-commerce and the Market Structure of Retail Industries by Emre, Onsel - University of Chicago et al.
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org
 
 
 
Working Paper #05-24 
 
October 2005 
 
E-commerce and the Market Structure of Retail Industries 
 
Onsel Emre 
University of Chicago 
 
Ali Hortacsu 
University of Chicago and NBER 
 
Chad Syverson 
University of Chicago and NBER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
E-commerce and the Market Structure of Retail
Industries1
O¨nsel Emre, University of Chicago
Ali Hortac¸su, University of Chicago and NBER
Chad Syverson, University of Chicago and NBER
September 30, 2005
1We gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from the NET Institute
(www.NETinst.org) and the NSF (award no. SES-0242031). The authors can be contacted
at the Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637
Abstract
While a fast-growing body of research has looked at how the advent and diffusion of e-
commerce has affected prices, much less work has investigated e-commerce’s impact on the
number and type of firms operating in an industry. This paper theoretically and empirically
takes up the question of which producers most benefit and most suffer as consumers switch
to purchasing products online. We specify a general industry model involving consumers
with differing search costs buying products from heterogeneous-type producers. We inter-
pret e-commerce as having created reductions in consumers’ search costs. We show how
such shifts in the search cost distribution reallocate market shares from an industry’s low-
type producers to its high-type businesses. We test the model using data for two industries
in which e-commerce has arguably decreased consumers’ search costs considerably: travel
agencies and bookstores. We find evidence in both industries of the market share shifts
predicted by the model. Interestingly, while both industries experienced similar changes,
the specific mechanisms through which e-commerce induced them were different. For travel
agencies, the shifts reflected aggregate changes driven by airlines’ reductions in agent com-
missions as consumers started buying tickets online. For bookstores, on the other hand,
industry-wide declines in small book stores reflected aggregated market-specific impacts,
evidenced by the fact that more small-store exit occurred in those local markets where
consumers’ use of e-commerce channels grew fastest.
1 Introduction
This paper explores how the advent and diffusion of e-commerce impacts the structure of re-
tail and similar industries. While there is a burgeoning literature studying how e-commerce
has affected prices and price dispersion (Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Brynjolfsson, Smith
(2000), Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001)), much less work has looked at how
the diffusion of the Internet has influenced the number or type of firms that operate in an
industry. That is, questions of which producers most benefit and most suffer (perhaps to
the point of having to cease operations) from the new consumer-matching and distribution
systems that e-commerce brings have received little attention. Anecdote-based conven-
tional wisdom has suggested that such effects can be large and diverse in impact; the rapid
growth of Orbitz, Travelocity, and Expedia at the expense of local travel agencies is one
oft-cited example. Yet we do not yet know quantitatively just how large this particular
effect has been, the scope the underlying mechanism driving the effect, or whether similar
mechanisms operate in other industries. This paper seeks to begin to address these issues.
It is almost certain that more than just equilibrium prices are affected when e-commerce
spreads in an industry. Market shares are very likely to change; given the reduction in con-
sumer search costs that e-commerce can bring, any firm’s price advantage will be multiplied
in terms of market-share gains. Higher cross-price elasticities imply differential impacts on
industry firms depending on whether they are at a cost advantage or disadvantage relative
to their competitors. It is also quite likely that these market share changes can be drastic
enough to lead some firms to exit from the market entirely. On the other hand, lower search
costs can lead to a market-expansion effect that induces new entry into the industry. Pre-
sumably, though, these entrants may differ on average from industry incumbents because
e-commerce has raised the return to being relatively efficient. In such ways, e-commerce
can have important entry and exit consequences as well.
Our investigative approach combines theoretical and empirical analyses. We first model
equilibrium in an industry comprised of heterogeneous firms selling to a set of consumers
who differ in their search costs. Firm types can be generally interpreted as differences in
underlying abilities like production costs or output quality. We embody them as differing
marginal costs for the sake of concreteness, though it is easy to modify the model to allow
variation in product quality levels instead. Industry consumers search sequentially when
deciding from whom to buy, or whether to purchase the industry product at all, since we
allow for the possibility that consumers may choose an outside good. Firms set prices given
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consumers’ optimal search behavior as well as their own and their rivals’ production costs.
Firms that cannot cover their fixed costs exit the industry, but additional firms can enter
upon paying an entry cost.
We interpret the advent and diffusion of e-commerce as a leftward shift in the consumer
search cost distribution. We use our model to show how e-commerce activity impacts
equilibrium market structure. The richness of the model offers predictions about not just
equilibrium prices but also market shares, the number of producers, and the producer type
(marginal cost) distribution. One advantage of our framework is that for many of our
empirical predictions, we do not need to make assumptions about how consumer search
costs are affected by e-commerce beyond simple first-order stochastic dominance.
The model predicts, as the previous literature has focused on, a decline in equilibrium
price levels and price dispersion. The more novel and important implications for our work,
however, regard what happens to the equilibrium distribution of firm types. Here the model
predicts that the introduction of e-commerce to an industry should result in the shrinking
and sometimes exit of low-type (i.e., high-cost) firms, a shift in market share to high-type
(low-cost) firms, and with some additional assumptions about the firm type and consumer
search cost distributions, a drop in the number of producers as well.
We test the model using County Business Patterns (CBP) data from 1994-2003. CBP
data contain, at the detailed industry level, the total number of establishments (stores) as
well as their size distribution. While we cannot measure type directly, we can use size as a
proxy; hence shifts in the size distribution are informative about heterogeneous effects of e-
commerce within an industry. The panel nature of the data allows us to focus on changes in
the distribution over time within local markets, removing possibly confounding differences
in technology or demand differences across markets. We identify local differences in the
impact of e-commerce (i.e., the size of the shift in the local search cost distribution) using
Forrester survey data on the fraction of the local population who report buying goods and
services online.
We focus on two industries perceived to have been considerably impacted by e-commerce:
travel agencies and bookstores. The empirical patterns support the predictions of the the-
oretical model: increases in purchases made using e-commerce infrastructure are linked to
declines in the number of small (and presumably low-type) establishments, but either do
not significantly impact or are even positively related to growth in the number of large es-
tablishments in the industry. Interestingly, while both industries experiences market share
shifts of a similar nature, the specific mechanisms linking declining search costs to the
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shifts were different across the industries. The shifts in the travel agency industry reflected
aggregate changes driven largely by airlines’ reducing agent commissions as consumers in-
creasingly shifted to online ticket sources. In bookstores, on the other hand, the evidence
suggests that the decline in small book stores reflect aggregated market-specific impacts.
We present the general industry model in the next section and explore its predictions for
how shifts in search costs impact equilibrium in an industry with heterogeneous producers.
The third section discusses the data used in the empirical analysis. This is followed by a
presentation and discussion of the empirical results. A short discussion concludes.
2 Model
Consider an industry with L firms selling a homogenous good for consumption by a large
number of consumers. Firms have different marginal costs of production, which are their
private information. Consumers have identical unit-elastic demand for the good being sold,
but are heterogenous in their search costs. Consumers do not know the price each firm
charges and learn them only through costly search.
The timing of decisions by firms and consumers are as follows. At the beginning of the
period, potential firms consider entering the industry. If a firm decides to enter, it pays
the sunk cost of entry, κ, and learns its own marginal cost c, which is drawn i.i.d. from
a cumulative density function (cdf) Γ (c) where c ∈ [0, 1]. Next, firms decide whether to
stay in the industry or not. Those that choose to stay decide then how much to charge and
produce. Production requires a fixed cost of operation ν, which is identical in all firms.
This cost can be avoided if the firm chooses to stay out of the market.1
Consumers do not know the particular price each firm charges, but do know the price
distribution, F (p) (with pdf f(p)), in the market. In order to learn about prices, consumers
visit stores and after every visit they decide whether to continue search. That is, consumers
are sequential searchers. After every visit, they compare the extra cost and benefit of
visiting one more store. If the value of expected reduction in price is greater than the
marginal (search) cost s, the consumer continues to search; otherwise, he buys the product
at the lowest price in hand. Thus, as characterized by McCall (1970), the optimal stopping
1We could have eliminated the fixed cost of operation from the model, but in that case, those firms that
otherwise exit the market would stay in the market by charging prices equal to their marginal costs. Thus
having a fixed cost in the model leads to the sensible implication that only firms that make positive profits
stay in the market.
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rule is characterized by a reservation rule given by:
s =
r∫
0
(r − p) f (p) dp (1)
where s is the marginal cost of search and the right hand side is the expected benefit from
finding a price less than the price in hand r.
Taking the derivative of (1) with respect to s and using the fact that r is a function of
s, we can find that reservation price rule as
s =
r∫
0
F (u) du (2)
Having defined the problem of consumers, we now turn to the problem of firms. We
assume that firms do not know the marginal costs and hence the prices set by their rivals,
but know the cdf of marginal costs Γ (c), with pdf γ (c).2 Further, firms do not know the
search cost of any individual but do know the distribution of search costs. Taking the cdf
of search costs Q (s) (with pdf q (s)) as given, each firm determines the demand it faces.
Specifically, considering the reservation price rule r (s) and the search cost distribution
Q (s), a firm with marginal cost c chooses an optimal price p and is committed to this
price.
Let us now consider the maximization problem of a firm with marginal cost draw c that
chose to stay in the industry. We first determine the market share3 x (p) of a firm that
charges price p. Clearly, only consumers with reservation prices r above p will buy from
this firm. Take one such consumer with reservation price r. If there are L firms in the
industry, on average there will be LF (r) firms charging a price less than r. This particular
consumer is equally likely to buy from any of these firms. That is, the probability that
she will buy from the firm charging price p is 1/LF (r). Integrating over all such potential
customers of this firm, we find
x (p) =
∞∫
p
g (r)
LF (r)
dr (3)
where g (r) is the pdf of reservation price, which is derived as follows. Using the reser-
vation price rule (2), we can write the cdf of reservation price G (r) as
2This leads to a Bayesian-Nash formulation of the pricing game. One caveat with this formulation is
that, with a small number of firms, rivals can “invert” each other’s prices to learn marginal costs, and
re-optimize against this in a subsequent period. Another justification for this modelling assumption is that
there are a large number of firms with differing marginal costs in the industry.
3In this paper, market share is used interchangeably with quantity supplied.
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G (r) = Q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
(4)
Taking the derivative of G (r) with respect to r, we find g (r) as
g (r) = q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
F (r) (5)
Inserting (5) into (3), the integral for market share simplifies to
x (p) =
1
L
∞∫
p
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
dr (6)
Therefore, the objective function of a firm with marginal cost c that chose to stay in
the industry becomes
max
p
{
(p− c) 1
L
∞∫
p
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
dr − ν
}
(7)
Going one stage back, the post-entry profit of a firm with marginal cost c can be written
as
V (c) = max
[
0,max
p
{
(p− c) 1
L
∞∫
p
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
dr − ν
}]
(8)
In the initial stage, ex-ante identical potential firms decide whether to enter or not.
This decision hence leads to the free entry condition
E [V (c)] =
∫
V (c) dΓ (c) = κ (9)
This free entry condition implies ex-ante zero profits and ex-post nonnegative profits.
Once a firm learns its productiveness, it either chooses to stay out of the market and avoid
the fixed cost of operation ν or stays in the market and chooses the price maximizing its
profits. The first order condition (FOC) to the profit maximization problem of firm with
marginal cost c, (7), is
(p− c) q
(
p∫
0
F (u) du
)
=
∞∫
p
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
dr
The price decision of a firm will depend on its type c, so the equilibrium price function
will be p = h (c). Inserting this into the FOC of the profit maximization condition, we
write the best response function of the firm with marginal cost c as
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(h (c)− c) q
(
h(c)∫
0
Γ
(
h−1 (u)
)
du
)
=
∞∫
h(c)
q
(
r∫
0
Γ
(
h−1 (u)
)
du
)
dr
where F (p) is replaced by Γ (h−1 (p))4. By changes of variables, for each c, this is
equivalent to
(h (c)− c) q
(
c∫
h−1(0)
Γ (y)h′ (y) dy
)
=
∞∫
h(c)
q
(
h−1(r)∫
h−1(0)
Γ (y)h′ (y) dy
)
dr (10)
Since we are seeking type-dependent equilibrium pricing strategies of the form p = h (c),
it is convenient to take the derivative of (10) with respect to c and solve for the equilibrium
price rule as a function of marginal cost. Thus, the differential equation corresponding to
the derivative of (10) with respect to c becomes
(2h′ (c)− 1) q
(
c∫
h−1(0)
Γ (y)h′ (y) dy
)
+ (h (c)− c)q′
(
c∫
h−1(0)
Γ (y)h′ (y) dy
)
Γ (c)h′ (c) = 0
(11)
2.1 Some Characteristics of Industry Equilibrium
First, note that there is a fixed cost of production ν, so every firm operating in the market
charges a price higher than its marginal cost. This can be seen from the FOC (10). The
second order conditions of firm maximization problem implies that for each c,
−2q
(
p∫
0
F (u) du
)
− (p− c) q′
(
p∫
0
F (u) du
)
F (p) < 0 (12)
Using this condition (12) and the differential equation (11), we can show that h′ (c) > 0.
That is, price is increasing with marginal cost.
Property 1 The equilibrium price of an operating firm is increasing with its marginal
cost; h′ (c) > 0.
Using Property 1 and taking the derivative of market share (6) with respect to c, we
can show that market share is decreasing with marginal cost. Let x (c) denote the market
share of a firm with unit cost c, then x′ (c) < 0.
Property 2 The market share of an operating firm is decreasing with its marginal cost;
x′ (c) < 0.
4The equality of F (p) and Γ
(
h−1 (p)
)
is shown in the Appendix.
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Let pi (c) represent the profits of an operating firm with marginal cost c, i.e., the second
term in the parenthesis in (8). Taking the derivative of pi (c) with respect to c and using
the FOC (10), we can find that
pi′ (c) = − 1
L
(h (c)− c) q
(
h(c)∫
0
F (u) du
)
< 0
Property 3 The profits of an operating firm is decreasing with its marginal cost;
pi′ (c) < 0.
Property 3 implies that there is a firm that is indifferent between staying in the industry
or not. The marginal cost of that firm is found from the following equality
(h (c)− c) 1
L∗
∞∫
h(c)
q
(
h−1(r)∫
h−1(0)
Γ (y)h′ (y) dy
)
dr − ν = 0 (13)
where L∗ is the equilibrium number of firms. Firms with marginal cost c > c choose to
stay out of the industry.
2.2 What happens when search costs decline?
In this section, we study the effect of a decline in the search cost of consumers due to their
access to the Internet. The search cost of consumers who have access to the Internet will
decline, changing the overall search cost distribution. The new search cost distribution Q̂ (s)
will then dominate the initial distribution in the sense of first order stochastic dominance
(FOSD). That is, the new search cost distribution will be above the initial search cost
distribution; Q̂ (s) ≥ Q (s) for all s.
Take the industry initially in equilibrium. Then, consumers’ search costs decline and
the new distribution becomes Q̂ (s). The following proposition indicates that prices go
down for a given level of marginal cost. Let p̂ = ĥ (c) denote the price a firm with marginal
cost c charges when the search cost distribution is Q̂ (s).
Proposition 1 If the consumers’ search costs decline and the new distribution Q̂ (s) dom-
inates the initial search cost distribution Q (s) in the sense of first order stochastic domi-
nance, the price a firm with marginal cost c charges declines; i.e., ĥ (c) ≤ h (c).
Proof. The FOSD also implies that there will be the following relationship between pdfs
q̂ (s) and q (s); for any s1 ≥ s0,
q̂ (s1)
q̂ (s0)
≤ q (s1)
q (s0)
(14)
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Let s0 and s1 be defined as
s0 =
h(c)∫
0
Γ
(
h−1 (u)
)
du
s1 =
r∫
0
Γ
(
h−1 (u)
)
du
Also, for r ≥ h (c), s1 ≥ s0. Thus, (14) becomes
q̂
(
r∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)
q̂
(
h(c)∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
) ≤ q
(
r∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)
q
(
h(c)∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)
Taking the integral over r and using (10),
∞∫
h(c)
q̂
(
r∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)
q̂
(
h(c)∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)dr ≤ ∞∫
h(c)
q
(
r∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)
q
(
h(c)∫
0
Γ (h−1 (u)) du
)dr = (h (c)− c)
Therefore h (c) can no longer be the equilibrium price of a firm with marginal cost c. In
order to maximize its profits, the firm with marginal cost c needs to reduce the price so that
the integral on the left hand side rises and the right hand side (p− c) declines. The new
equilibrium is achieved at price p̂ = ĥ (c) where ĥ (c) ≤ h (c).
The weak inequality in the proposition can be explained as follows. Suppose that there
is only a small decline in the search cost of a consumer with the highest level of search cost.
The decline in search cost is such that the consumer who used to buy from the first store
she comes across will continue to buy from the first store she notices. This change will
not affect the marginal condition (10) of any firm in the industry. To see this, note that
the RHS of (10) indicates the demand a firm charging price p faces. Since that particular
consumer chooses the first store she notices, her reservation price should be higher than
any price in the market. Therefore, the integral on the RHS, which includes this particular
consumer, will stay the same. The second term on the LHS, which indicates the demand
coming from customers with the lowest search cost possible, will stay the same as well. The
equality in (10) will be satisfied if that firm continues to charge price p. Therefore, firms
will charge the same prices as before and the price distribution will remain the same.
Consider another example where there is a small decline in the search cost of a consumer
who is the marginal customer of firm with cost c. Using similar arguments, we can observe
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that the price that firm finds it optimal to charge will decline. Since there is no change in
the marginal demand other firms face, all other firms will continue to charge the same prices
as before, make positive profits, and hence stay in the market. Under these conditions, if
the firm with c happens to stay in the market, L∗ will be the same and the LHS of (13)
will become negative. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium outcome; instead, the firm
with c chooses to exit, reducing the equilibrium number of firms in the market.
These two examples might suggest that the effects on the cutoff marginal level c and
the equilibrium number of firms L∗ depend on the type of changes in the search cost
distribution. Furthermore, if a firm is to exit the market, it must be the firm with the
highest marginal cost c since profits are decreasing with marginal cost (Property 3). This
also implies that if a cutoff value of c declines with a change in the search cost distribution,
the equilibrium number of firms declines L∗ as well. The following proposition attempts to
formalize these results.
Proposition 2 Consider a market initially in equilibrium.
(i) If the consumers’ search costs decline and the new distribution Q̂ (s) dominates the
initial search cost distribution Q (s) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, i.e.,
Q̂ (s) ≥ Q (s) for all s, then the new equilibrium values of cutoff marginal cost
(
ĉ
)
and the
number of firms L̂∗ are less than or equal to their initial counterparts;
(
ĉ
)
≤ c, L̂∗ ≤ L∗.
(ii) If, in addition to that, Q̂ (s) satisfies the condition Q̂ (s) > Q (s) for s ≥ s, where
s is defined as
s =
h(c)∫
0
F (u) du,
then, the new equilibrium values of cutoff marginal cost
(
ĉ
)
and the number of firms
L̂∗ are less than their initial counterparts;
(
ĉ
)
< c, L̂∗ < L∗.
Proof. The proof of (ii) is provided only, as (i) can easily derived from it. The condition
Q̂ (s) > Q (s) for s ≥ s implies that
∞∫
s
q̂ (s) ds <
∞∫
s
q (s) ds
for all s ≥ s. Using the definition of s in (2), this condition can be re-written as
∞∫
ĥ(c)
q̂
(
r∫
0
F̂ (u) du
)
F̂ (r) dr <
∞∫
h(c)
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
F (r) dr
for h (c) ≥ h (c), where F̂ (p) is the new equilibrium price distribution. Note that h (c)
(or ĥ (c)) is the highest price in the market (Property 1), so for r ≥ h (c) (or ĥ (c)),
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F (r) = 1 (or F̂ (r) = 1). Therefore, this inequality is equivalent to
∞∫
ĥ(c)
q̂
(
r∫
0
F̂ (u) du
)
dr <
∞∫
h(c)
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
dr
This implies that from (13)(
ĥ (c)− c
) 1
L∗
∞∫
ĥ(c)
q̂
(
r∫
0
F̂ (u) du
)
dr − ν < (h (c)− c) 1
L∗
∞∫
h(c)
q
(
r∫
0
F (u) du
)
dr − ν = 0
as ĥ (c) < h (c) from Proposition 1. Therefore, the firm with marginal cost c will exit
the market, reducing the equilibrium number of firms in the market.
Intuitively, the decline in search costs should be significant enough to affect the demand
less efficient firms face. If there is only a decline in the search cost of consumers who used
to have relatively low search costs, only relatively efficient firms reduce their prices and
profits. Since the marginal condition of less efficient firms is not distorted, c and L∗ stay
the same.
Note also that the combination of the decline in the cutoff level of marginal cost and
Proposition 1 (and Property 1) implies a downward shift in the equilibrium price distribu-
tion. Since the cutoff marginal cost level declines, the range of the price distribution also
declines, in line with the empirical result of Brown and Goolsbee (2002) regarding a decline
in the dispersion of prices (if “dispersion” is defined as the range of the distribution).
Before ending this section, a final remark is in order. In the second proposition, we
are comparing an industry before and after a change in search cost distribution. We are
not studying two industries that start with two different search cost distributions such as
Q (s) and Q̂ (s). If a market starts with Q̂ (s) from the beginning, the equilibrium outcome
would be different from the outcome that market reaches when Q (s) becomes Q̂ (s) later in
time. When there is an initial equilibrium with Q (s), the decline in search costs affect the
firms already in the market, i.e., firms that paid the entry cost κ. If a market starts with
Q̂ (s), all potential firms are affected and the values of c and L∗ are determined jointly.
The next two sections turn to special distribution functions and study the equilibrium
outcomes. The next section illustrates the results of this section in an example that can be
solved analytically. The following section provides a numerical algorithm to characterize
industry equilibrium for general parametric specifications and demonstrates the equilibrium
outcomes in an example solved by this algorithm.
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2.2.1 Uniform Search Cost Distribution
We first focus on the case where search costs and firm productivities are uniformly dis-
tributed, where the analysis turns out to be analytically tractable. Let the search cost
distribution and marginal cost distribution be
Q (s) = s/a, 0 ≤ s ≤ a, a > 0,
Γ (c) = c, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
Using (10), we can show that the best response function of a firm with marginal cost c
is
h (c) =
1
2
c+
√
a (15)
as long as c > 2
√
a, i.e., if there is a customer with reservation price higher than h (c)
(This can be derived using (2)). Under these circumstances, the cutoff level of marginal
cost c is determined through equation (13) and is equal to
1
aL∗
(√
a− 1
2
c
)2
= ν (16)
Suppose that there is a decline in search costs such that Q̂ (s) = s/â, 0 ≤ s ≤ â < a.
Since profits are decreasing with marginal cost, first the firm with marginal cost c considers
staying in the market or not. (16) indicates that the LHS becomes negative and the firm
with c exits the market. In other words,
dc
da
> 0
Since dL∗/dc > 0, this also means dL∗/da > 0.
Note also that when a becomes small enough so that the reservation price of consumer
with the highest search cost, i.e., s = a, becomes less than the price charged by the firm
with c, the new cutoff value becomes the smaller of c determined by (16) and c = 2
√
a.
2.2.2 Numerical Simulations
To investigate the comparative statics of the model for more general model parameters,
equation (11) can also be solved numerically. The algorithm used to solve it can be sum-
marized as follows: differential equation (11) can be solved up to an initial condition. The
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initial condition is determined by the constraint that the marginal entrant’s post-entry
profit is equal to zero. However, this also requires that we find the cost draw of the
marginal interim entrant, which is determined by the free-entry condition.
The parameters of the model are q(s), the pdf of consumer search costs, γ(c), the pdf of
marginal costs, κ the sunk entry cost, and ν, the fixed operating cost. In the following set
of figures, we simulate equilibrium market structure in our model using the specification
q(s) = λe−λs, s ≥ 0, γ(c) = 1, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, ν = 0.0008, κ = 0.001. We vary λ to get a
spectrum of search costs that vary in the first-order stochastic dominance sense.
In figure 1, we plot the search cost distributions used in the simulations. We used three
levels of search costs, λ ∈ {0.5, 1, 2}, where the mean search cost is given by 1/λ. Given
the search cost distribution, we solve for the equilibrium entry and pricing decisions of the
firms.
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium size (or sales) of a firm with a given marginal cost draw,
c. Intuitively, the figure shows that more efficient (lower marginal cost) firms are larger
in industry equilibrium. However, we are more interested in the comparative static result
as to what happens to firm size as search costs decline. As can be seen from the figure,
as search costs decline (λ increases from 0.5 to 2), more efficient firms increase their sales
more than less efficient firms do – i.e., market share is reallocated between firms in a way
that favors more efficient firms. As can also be seen from the right end of the figure, the
marginal cost cutoff for operation becomes smaller as search costs decline – higher search
costs allow less efficient firms to survive in equilibrium.
We have replicated the above qualitative result (that more efficient firms grow larger
the decline in search costs) with several different specifications of search cost distributions,
productivity distributions, fixed and sunk costs.
Thus, the main empirical hypothesis of our model is that e-commerce has differing
effects across the establishment size distribution. Low-type firms are hurt, sometimes to
the point of being forced to exit, but higher types actually gain from the shift.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses data from two primary sources: industry employment and
establishment counts from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP), and
consumers’ online purchasing behavior from Forrester Research Technographics surveys.
We briefly describe these data sets here, as well as discuss our market definition.
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3.1 County Business Patterns
Annual County Business Patterns data contain, by detailed industry, the number of estab-
lishments in each county in the U.S. Establishments are unique geographic locations where
economic activity takes place (i.e., offices in the travel agency industry and storefronts in
the bookstore industry). A firm can own one or more establishments.5 . Both the total
number of establishments and establishment counts by employment range are included in
the data.6In cases where disclosure of confidential information is not an issue, total in-
dustry employment and payroll in the county are also reported. However, these are often
missing in the industries we study, particularly in smaller counties that are served by only
a handful of firms. We can, however, impute total employment by multiplying the estab-
lishment counts in an employment range category by an estimate of the average number of
employees per establishment in the category. We use the simple average of the categories’
endpoints for this estimate. While imputations invariably introduce measurement error,
we are reassured by the fact that the correlation between imputed and actual reported
employment for those counties where the latter is available is quite high. Further, most of
the empirical work below focuses on establishment counts, which are never imputed.
We use data spanning 1994 to 2003, which surrounds the period when the advent of
browser software began the Internet’s diffusion into the broader population. It is also the
time span over for which CBP data are available with the level of industry detail necessary
for our purposes here. We focus on two industries: travel agencies (SIC 4724/NAICS
561510) and bookstores (SIC 5942, NAICS 451211). While a major change in the industry
classification scheme occurred in 1997 (from the SIC system to the NAICS taxonomy),
both industries’ boundaries remained unaffected, so values before and after the change are
comparable.
3.2 Household Internet Use
The data on households’ e-commerce activity comes from Forrester Research, a market
research company that has a program focusing on consumers’ technology use. Its annual
Technographics survey is designed to be nationally representative and includes the responses
5While it would be very interesting to study the issues at hand in the context of within- and across-firm
shifts, there is unfortunately no way to identify firms in the CBP data.
6The reported ranges are: 1-4 employees, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, and over
1000 employees. Since large establishments are relatively uncommon in the industries we study here, we
aggregate the four largest categories into a single 100 employees and over category.
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of roughly 55,000 people living in the continental U.S.7
We have access to the 2003 and 2004 surveys. Survey responses reflect behavior in the
year previous to the title year, because the survey is typically administered from prior-year
December through title-year January. For example, when the 2004 survey asks respondents
about their behavior over the past year, the answers reflect actions taken in 2003.
While the survey is primarily cross-sectional, conveniently for us there is a retrospective
question asking when the respondent “start[ed] purchasing products or services online.”
The respondent can choose one of several time ranges: “less than 1 year ago,” “1 year
to less than 2 years ago,” and so on up to “8 years ago or more.” We construct from
these responses the fraction of market consumers that had started purchasing products or
services online for each year from 1994 through 2003.8
3.3 Market Definition
We define markets using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Component Economic Areas
(CEAs). CEAs are collections of counties usually, but not always, centered on Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs). Counties are selected for inclusion in a given CEA based upon
their MSA status, commuting flows, and newspaper circulation patterns, subject to the
condition that CEAs counties are contiguous. CEA boundaries need not coincide with state
boundaries. The selection criteria ensure that counties in a given CEA are economically
intertwined. The roughly 3200 U.S. counties are grouped this way into 348 markets that
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the land mass of the United States. Since our
Internet use data excludes Alaska and Hawaii, our empirical analysis uses data for the 345
7See Goolsbee (2000) for additional details about the survey.
8We used the 2003 survey to compute the fraction of online shoppers in 1994 and 1995, and the 2004
survey to compute the fractions from 1996 to 2003. This results from the fact that the “8 years ago or
more” responses in the 2004 survey correspond to any purchases occurring before 1996, not necessarily
exclusively in 1995. We do see 1995 purchase patterns, however, in the 2003 survey (through the “7 years
to less than 8 years ago” responses). We are still left with online activity in 1994 being measured with
the “8 years ago or more” responses. However, given the small fractions of respondents reporting buying
products online in 1995 (see below), in addition to the fact that the Internet’s commercial structure at that
time was quite embryonic, it is unlikely that many of the purchases attributed to 1994 actually occurred
before that year. The necessary use of two separate surveys over the observation period does not seem to
have created spurious increases in reported online purchases. There is no discernable trend break between
1995 and 1996, the surveys’ point of contact.
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CEAs in the continental U.S.9
Using CEAs offers a compromise between conflicting requirements of the analysis. The
most constraining is that, with an Internet use sample of 55,000, using smaller market
areas (like counties) would result in many markets having very thin samples. Aggregating
the Technographics survey to the CEA level reduces the sampling error involved, though
of course with the tradeoff of losing some variation in market structures. Further, counties
may in some cases be too small to accurately capture market areas in the industries we
investigate. This is particularly true in more rural areas, where cross-county commerce in
travel agency and bookstores is likely to be commonplace. CEAs should be large enough
to envelop businesses’ catchment areas in most cases.
To give an idea of the size of markets in our data, Table 1 presents summary statistics of
within-CEA establishment counts in our two industries. In order to highlight across-market
differences, we first take the within-market average establishment counts over our sample
period, and then report quantiles of the cross-sectional distribution of these averages. The
table shows quantiles for the total number of establishments as well as for each of the
employment size categories. We note, however, that our empirical specifications below
include market fixed effects, so that the estimated relationships between market structure
and consumers’ online shopping behavior reflect within-market variation over time.
4 Empirical Tests
We seek to test the model’s implications regarding how a shift in the consumer search cost
distribution impacts industry market structure, particularly with regard to the relative
fortunes of high- and low-type producers. Our focus, as mentioned previously, is on two
industries where a shift in consumer activity to e-commerce channels has been cited as
having a noted impact on industry producers. While these two industries are in many ways
suitable for our analysis, they do not present perfect matches to the stylized industry in
the model. We do find it entirely plausible, as the model assumes, that there are significant
and persistent differences in producers’ types in these industries. The most relevant type
dimension in these two industries is, it seems to us, the per-dollar cost to industry produc-
ers of delivering a bundle of goods and services at a given quality level. Where reality and
the model depart, however, is with regard to horizontal product differentiation. This is not
9See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1995) for more detailed information about creation of CEAs
and the super-regions that they comprise, Economic Areas.
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modeled in the above theory, but it almost surely exists to some extent in both industries.
Such differentiation decreases, just as with search costs, consumers’ abilities to substitute
across industry producers. So product differentiation may dampen the quantitative im-
pact of the substitutability-enhancing (via reduced search cost) features of e-commerce.
However, it seems unlikely that any (likely modest) changes in the overall level of product
differentiation in our industries over the sample would be large enough to negate the di-
rection of the model’s predicted effects that are the primary focus of our empirical testing.
Indeed, it is not even clear that product differentiation increased in either industry. To
the extent that any changes did occur, our estimates offer guidance as to the magnitude of
e-commerce’s impact net of product differentiation shifts.
4.1 Travel Agencies
Much has been made about the demise of the travel agent due to consumers’ shifting travel
purchases to e-commerce cites like travel search engines (e.g., Orbitz or Expedia) or to
travel service providers themselves (with particular regard to buying tickets directly from
airlines’ websites). However, we are unaware of any attempt to formally analyze whether
or not this is happening, and if it is, its magnitude and the manner in which it works.
The model offers guidance as to the likely mechanism and its impact: declining search
costs (here, the ability directly access airlines’ ticket sales service online or the several fare
search engines or discount bidding sites) led to a decline among the low-type producers
in the industry and a shift in market share to the highest-type operations. (Whether or
not the overall size of the industry declines in the model depends the sizes of the fixed
operating cost and sunk entry costs.)
Aggregate statistics leave little doubt that the diffusion of the Internet coincided with
considerable establishment exit in the travel agency industry. Figure 3 plots two time
series: the total number of industry establishments, and the fraction of Technographics
survey respondents reporting that they had first purchased products or services online by
a given year. The number of travel agency establishments was fairly steady, in fact slightly
rising, until 1997, at which time it began to fall substantially. The number of establishments
in the industry dropped by over 35 percent between 1997 and 2003. As can be seen, this
exit coincided with a post-1997 acceleration in the fraction of surveyed consumers reporting
online purchases.
This broad exit pattern was concentrated among the industry’s smaller operations.
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Panel A of Table 2 contains establishment counts by establishment size category (size is
measured by number of employees). Over the sample period, establishment counts fell
in the four smallest employment categories: those including establishments with fewer
than 50 employees. At the same time, though, the number of establishments with 50 or
more employees actually rose. Proportionately, the 5-9 employment class saw the greatest
decline, nearly one-half, while the numbers of the largest establishments (those with 100 or
more employees) grew 70 percent. The shakeout at the low end was therefore accompanied
by growth among the largest industry producers.10
These patterns are consistent with those seen in the model. A decline in search costs,
made possible through the diffusion of the Internet and the advent and improvement of
travel-shopping websites, shifted equilibrium production to the larger, higher-type produc-
ers in the industry. Indeed, some of these high-type producers may be hosting the very
portals that led to the decline of their smaller competitors.
To show the connection more formally, we regress the (logged) number of industry
employees and establishments in a CEA market on the fraction of people in the market
who reported making purchases online by that year. Because Internet use diffused sooner
into urban areas for reasons likely unrelated to its use for purchasing travel services, there is
an underlying positive correlation across markets in the number of travel agencies and the
fraction of consumers using the Internet. If we did not control for these differences, we would
spuriously conclude that greater Internet use led to increases in travel agency numbers.
We therefore include CEA fixed effects in this and all of our empirical specifications. The
estimates thus reflect the relationship between changes in online purchase frequencies and
industry activity within CEA markets. We also control for employment across all industries
in the market-year (also taken from the CBP data) to account the influence of overall market
growth or decline on the industry.
The results, reported in Panel B of Table 2, reflect the aggregate patterns above.11
10The CBP establishment-level data does not allow one to track individual establishments through time.
Therefore, it is conceptually possible that even a growing industry could exhibit net establishment losses at
lower employment ranges due to formerly small businesses growing into larger size categories. However, this
scenario would imply that the total number of establishments in the industry remained roughly unchanged.
This is clearly not the case here. One possibility that cannot be ruled out, however, is that many small
establishments were merged into larger ones. This would shrink establishment counts both at the low end
of the distribution and in total. To the extent mergers played a role, though, we show shortly that the
employment growth among large establishments did not fully make up for employment losses among the
industry’s small operators.
11The different sample sizes across establishment size categories result because not all market-year ob-
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Higher fractions of consumers buying goods and services online are associated with declines
in the numbers of industry employees and establishments in the market. The implied impact
of consumers’ e-commerce activity is quite negative for the smallest establishments. For
example, a 15 percentage point increase in the fraction of consumers making purchases
online, a one standard deviation change, corresponds to a 13 percent (21 percent) drop
in establishments with 1-4 employees (5-9 employees). Notice, however, that this negative
impact lessens as one works up the establishment size distribution. Indeed, it eventually
becomes insignificant with positive point estimates for establishments with 50-99 employees
and those with 100 employees or more. The results in the first numerical column indicate
that any employment gains in the larger size classes are swamped by employment losses
due to the exit of smaller establishments. Overall market employment, not shown here,
enters positively and significantly in most of the specifications, as one might expect.
Greater e-commerce activity among consumers is therefore associated with losses among
the smallest industry producers, but may actually spur growth of the largest producers.
Despite the inclusion of market fixed effects, however, the test above does not answer the
question of whether the market structure impact of the shift to e-commerce acts locally
or instead more broadly. It could be that the many within-market changes reflect aggre-
gate shifts, and while the overall increase in Internet purchasing behavior shifts industry
market shares in the direction predicted by the model, there is no sense in which this
impact is noticeably stronger in markets that saw larger increases in consumers’ Internet
use than in those that saw smaller gains. To answer the question of the geographic scope
of e-commerce’s impact in the industry, we add a set of year dummies to the regression.
This removes the impact of aggregate shifts in Internet use, leaving only the idiosyncratic
within-market variation in the growth of online purchasing patterns and establishment
counts to identify the coefficient. In essence, this regression tests if markets that had
unusually high increases in Internet use in a particular year also saw larger-than-average
declines in small-establishment counts and larger-than-average growth in the numbers of
large establishments.
The regression results (with year dummy coefficients not reported for parsimony) are
servations have a positive number of establishments in a particular category. Obviously, this is more likely
to be the case for the counts of larger establishments. To see if these missing values were closely tied to the
results, we reran the regressions using as the dependent variable the log of the number of establishments
plus one. The magnitudes estimated coefficients were smaller in magnitude-as one might expect given this
essentially adds a number of zeros to the dependent variables in the sample-but the qualitative features
seen here remained.
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in Table 2, Panel C. In this case all coefficients on the measure of consumers’ e-commerce
activity are statistically insignificant. There is no measurable market-specific influence of
online purchases on local travel agencies. This indicates, very interestingly, that the shifts
in industry market structure seen above, while coincident with consumers’ increasing use of
online sites to conduct their travel purchases, did not arise from a set of coordinated market
structure shifts in specific markets that produced the observed patterns once aggregated up.
Instead, the influence of Internet use on market structure in the industry is a completely
aggregate phenomenon.
A consideration of the industry’s institutional details offers a likely explanation for this
result. As Internet purchases of airline tickets became more common over our observation
period, airlines gradually decreased the commissions they paid to travel agents. The first
modest commission cut (imposing a $50 cap per domestic ticket, which given the standard
10 percent rate at the time meant it was only binding for tickets above $500) occurred
in 1995.12 This ended up being only the first cut of a series, however. By 2002, all
major carriers had ceased paying commissions altogether. Since airline tickets accounted
for an estimated 58 percent of travel agencies’ revenues in 1996, these commission declines
resulted in a serious income loss for the industry (some lost commissions were replaced
by fees charged directly to the consumer, though these did not cover the losses). Small
operations, having high fixed costs relative to their sales volume, found it increasingly
difficult to be profitable and began to exit, as seen in the data. Importantly, airlines’
commission-cutting decisions were implemented nationwide, presumably in response to
perceived changes in consumers’ aggregate ticket purchasing patterns rather than market-
specific changes. We are aware of no evidence that airlines selectively reduced commissions
more in those particular markets where online purchases were growing fastest. This would
explain why the connection between Internet use and market structure changes is starkly
evident in aggregate changes over time but not so across markets within a period. It is also
consistent with the fact that growth among the largest establishments was uncorrelated
with local Internet use, because many of these establishments plausibly tapped into the
new (and national) Internet market, and drew their business growth largely from customers
12The facts on travel agent commissions discussed in this paragraph are from a 2002 report by the
National Commission to Ensure Consumer Information and Choice in the Airline Industry (NCECICAI
2002). The creation of the NCECICAI was a provision of the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21st Century. The commission’s congressionally mandated mission was to study the travel agent industry
and, more generally, the airline services information available to consumers.
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outside their local area.
4.2 Bookstores
Another line of business that has by many accounts in the popular press been affected
by the diffusion of Internet commerce is the retail bookstores industry. The first major
Internet retailer, Amazon.com, began of course as a book-selling specialist. Many other
online booksellers have since arisen, from e-commerce branches of large chain booksellers
(e.g., bn.com) to dealers specializing in narrower markets like textbooks, used books, and
rare books. Several brick-and-mortar booksellers have blamed their demise in large part
on online competition (see, for example, Herman 2001, Weisman 2004, and Melo 2005).
The process through which this competitive effect would take place is again that which is
highlighted in our model: e-commerce induced reductions in consumers’ search costs shift
market share across the industry type distribution.
We investigate this possibility by repeating the empirical analyses above, this time
using CBP data for the bookstores (SIC 5942/NAICS 451211) industry. We begin with
the industry-wide establishment counts shown in Panel A of Table 3. They reflect similar
patterns to those seen with the travel agency aggregates: declines in establishments in the
smaller employment size categories with coincident expansion in the larger categories. For
instance, while the number of bookstores with fewer than 20 employees fell by over one-
fourth during the sample, those with more than 20 employees more than doubled. This
growth was particularly pronounced among the 50-99 employee size category. So we again
see the pattern of market share shifts from small (low-type) operations to large (high-type)
ones.
Again the question arises of whether these effects reflect aggregate impacts or instead
coincide with local Internet commerce patterns. No obvious institutional analogy exists
in the bookstores industry to the airlines’ commission reductions and their impact on
travel agencies. Therefore one might expect the impact of the Internet here to be more
concentrated within particular markets. If this is the case, the overall shift from smaller to
larger bookstores noted above reflects aggregated changes that occurred market-by-market.
We investigate this issue by estimating the above specification that includes year fixed
effects, this time using bookstores CBP data. The results are reported in Panel B of Table
3. Again we have suppressed the estimated year effects and the coefficients on overall
market employment.
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In contrast to the market structure shifts in the travel agency industry, there is more
evidence that local market effects matter in bookstores. Markets seeing faster growth in
local consumers making online purchases had greater declines in bookstore employment
and the total number of bookstores, with establishment exit being driven by losses among
operations having fewer than 20 employees. This increased exit was statistically significant,
excepting the case of establishments with less than five employees.
On the other hand, there is weaker evidence that local online purchasing behavior im-
pacts the growth seen among larger booksellers. None of the e-commerce activity (“fraction
online”) coefficients for the three largest size categories, while reflecting the positive co-
movement between online shopping and the numbers of larger bookstores, are statistically
significant. This is likely due to the fact that the industry classification system includes an
industry separate from bookstores, ”Electronic Shopping and Mail-Order Houses” (NAICS
45411), into which the largest online booksellers are classified.13 The expansion seen within
the bookstores industry instead may reflect the ascendance of the new-format large-store
chains like Barnes and Noble and Borders. Their growth is not strongly correlated with
local online shopping habits because, while these sellers have extensive online operations
(Barnes and Noble has its own website and Borders has teamed with Amazon), their on-
line operations have industrial classifications that are separate in the CBP data from their
brick-and-mortar locations.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the equilibrium market structure changes that be spurred by
the introduction of e-commerce tools that reduce consumers’ search costs. We specified
a general industry model involving consumers with differing search costs buying products
from heterogeneous-type producers. Solving for the equilibrium in the general case, we
showed how shifts in the consumer search cost distribution impact equilibrium prices and
market shares. Specifically, downward shifts in search costs lead to lower prices and shift
13Note that online airline ticket sales operations are not included in this industry. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, businesses in NAICS 45411 sold $4.16 billion of books and magazines in 2003, $2.14 billion
of which was exchanged via ”e-commerce” channels (these are defined as transactions over open networks
like the Internet or proprietary networks running systems like Electronic Data Interchange). These book
and magazine sales accounted for 3.2 percent and 5.3 percent of the industry’s total and e-commerce
product sales, respectively. See U.S. Census Bureau (2005) for details.
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market share from low-type producers to the industry’s high-type businesses.
While there is an empirical literature investigating the advent and diffusion of e-commerce
on prices, little has been done regarding the market structure impacts-specifically, the shifts
in market share from low- to high-type businesses that our model predicts. We test these
predictions in two industries for which the introduction of e-commerce has arguably de-
creased consumers’ search costs considerably: travel agencies and bookstores.
We found evidence of the market share shifts predicted by the model. As consumers’
use of the Internet to make purchases rose, smaller establishments (where size reflects
firm “type”) declined in number and larger establishments became more dominant. The
net impact of these opposing changes on the total number of industry employees and
establishments was negative in both industries, indicating that the shifts were not merely
reflecting the shifting of establishments into larger size categories as the grew, but instead
truly reflected exit of the industries’ smaller operations.
Interestingly, while the nature of the market share shifts were similar in both industries,
the specific mechanisms through which the declining search costs created them were dif-
ferent. For travel agencies, the shifts reflected aggregate changes, common across markets,
driven in large part by airlines’ reductions in agent commissions in response to consumers’
increasing use of online sources to buy tickets. This is evidenced by the fact that once these
aggregate changes in Internet purchasing patterns were controlled for, there was no indica-
tion that the magnitude of the market share changes were any larger (smaller) in markets
experiencing idiosyncratically high (low) growth in consumers’ online purchases. For book-
stores, on the other hand, there was evidence that more exit occurred among smaller stores
in those markets where Internet use grew fastest. This suggests that the industry-wide
declines in small book stores reflect aggregated market-specific impacts. There was less
evidence, however, that the observed growth in the number of large book stores was corre-
lated with shifts in local activity. These instead appear to reflect an aggregate reshuffling
of the way business is conducted in the industry.
5.1 Appendix
Derivation of equilibrium distribution of prices:
F (p) = Γ
(
h−1 (p)
)
This equality can be obtained from the relationship between the pdf’s of marginal cost
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distribution γ (c) and price distribution f (p) :
f (p) = γ (c)
∣∣∣∣dcdp
∣∣∣∣ = γ (c) 1h′ (c) = γ (h−1 (p)) 1h′ (h−1 (p))
and
F (p) =
p∫
−∞
f (z) dz =
p∫
−∞
γ
(
h−1 (z)
) 1
h′ (h−1 (z))
dz =
h−1(p)∫
−∞
γ (w) dw = Γ
(
h−1 (p)
)
If there is a price p charged by the highest-cost firm in the industry c, the relationship
becomes
F (p) =
{
Γ (h−1 (p)) for p < p
Γ (h−1 (p)) = Γ (c) for p ≥ p
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Figure 1: Search cost distributions
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Figure 2: Changes in search costs and firm sizes
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Figure 3. Total Travel Agency Establishments and Consumers’ Internet Purchases 
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Table 1. Cross-Sectional Comparison of CEA Markets 
 
 
A. Average Establishment Counts: Travel Agencies 
 
 Mean 25%ile Median 75%ile 
Total Establishments 74.3 10.8 22.4 58.3 
Estabs. w/ 1-4 employees 48.4 6.6 13.6 35.7 
Estabs. w/ 5-9 employees 16.8 3 6 13.7 
Estabs. w/ 10-19 employees 5.9 0.7 1.9 4.5 
Estabs. w/ 20-49 employees 2.3 0 0.6 1.8 
Estabs. w/ 50-99 employees 0.6 0 0 0.4 
Estabs. w/ over 100 employees 0.4 0 0 0.1 
 
 
B. Average Establishment Counts: Bookstores 
 
 Mean 25%ile Median 75%ile 
Total Establishments 35.4 9.8 17.8 36.6 
Estabs. w/ 1-4 employees 15.3 4.3 8.3 17.8 
Estabs. w/ 5-9 employees 9.9 2.8 5 10.5 
Estabs. w/ 10-19 employees 6.0 1.4 2.8 6.2 
Estabs. w/ 20-49 employees 3.1 0.6 1.4 3.5 
Estabs. w/ 50-99 employees 1.0 0 0.3 1.1 
Estabs. w/ over 100 employees 0.2 0 0 0.1 
 
Notes: Table reports moments of within-CEA average establishment counts over the sample.  There are a 
total of 345 CEA markets in the sample. 
Table 2. Market Structure Patterns: Travel Agencies 
 
 
A. Establishment Counts: U.S. Aggregates 
 
  Employment Category 
Year Total 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
1994 28,118 18,186 6,774 2,121 759 169 109 
1995 28,099 18,089 6,710 2,212 802 176 110 
1996 28,735 18,654 6,724 2,181 859 200 117 
1997 29,452 19,183 6,758 2,332 834 206 139 
1998 28,776 18,460 6,755 2,325 861 212 163 
1999 27,390 17,611 6,281 2,276 821 225 176 
2000 25,975 16,783 5,836 2,091 845 234 186 
2001 24,654 16,050 5,306 2,000 853 243 202 
2002 21,079 14,281 4,151 1,581 681 201 184 
2003 18,860 12,865 3,556 1,430 653 182 174 
 
 
B. Local Market Structure and Fraction Purchasing Online in Market 
 
 ln(total ln(total ln(establishments) by Employment Category 
 emp.) estabs.) 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
N 3449 3449 3426 3306 2548 1740 783 538 
R2 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.83 0.84 
Fraction 
Online 
-0.932* 
(0.047) 
-1.117* 
(0.026) 
-0.906* 
(0.036) 
-1.538* 
(0.047) 
-0.870* 
(0.065) 
-0.357* 
(0.070) 
0.072 
(0.106) 
0.161 
(0.137) 
 
 
C. Local Market Structure and Fraction Purchasing Online in Market, with Year Fixed 
Effects 
 
 ln(total ln(total ln(establishments) by Employment Category 
 emp.) estabs.) 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
N 3449 3449 3426 3306 2548 1740 783 538 
R2 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.84 
Fraction 
Online 
0.278 
(0.165) 
0.033 
(0.084) 
0.029 
(0.138) 
-0.075 
(0.161) 
-0.178 
(0.226) 
0.180 
(0.251) 
-0.218 
(0.509) 
-0.195 
(0.592) 
 
Notes: All regression specifications include CEA market fixed effects and control for (logged) overall 
employment in the market-year.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  An asterisk denotes significance at 
the five percent level.
Table 3. Market Structure Patterns: Bookstores 
 
 
A. Establishment Counts: U.S. Aggregates 
 
  Employment Category 
Year Total 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
1994 13,520 6,625 3,840 2,198 708 102 47 
1995 13,403 6,234 3,985 2,165 806 154 59 
1996 13,134 5,916 4,039 1,940 966 211 62 
1997 12,301 5,254 3,753 2,021 933 286 54 
1998 12,151 5,031 3,588 2,025 1,088 357 62 
1999 11,957 4,878 3,467 2,063 1,076 410 63 
2000 11,662 4,641 2,953 2,349 1,163 485 71 
2001 11,559 4,678 3,100 2,023 1,276 411 71 
2002 12,178 5,494 2,777 2,089 1,275 475 68 
2003 11,036 4,493 2,900 1,909 1,237 428 69 
 
 
B. Local Market Structure and Fraction Purchasing Online in Market, with Year Fixed 
Effects 
 
 ln(total ln(total ln(establishments) by Employment Category 
 emp.) estabs.) 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
N 3448 3448 3386 3338 3031 2400 1275 423 
R2 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.74 
Fraction 
Online 
-0.307* 
(0.148) 
-0.316* 
(0.115) 
-0.161 
(0.172) 
-0.398* 
(0.187) 
-0.817* 
(0.210) 
0.220 
(0.208) 
0.485 
(0.357) 
0.003 
(0.377) 
 
Notes: All regression specifications include CEA market fixed effects and control for (logged) overall 
employment in the market-year.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  An asterisk denotes significance at 
the five percent level. 
 
